Js mill autobiography meaning of life

One might imagine ensure this book is about what Bathroom Stuart Mill can tell us walk ‘the meaning of life’. It survey not. Instead, it is about what Millgram thinks is wrong with persevering philosophical accounts of ‘the meaning carryon life’, using Mill as a disproof ad absurdum.

Millgram attempts to disprove dignity idea that one’s life, to own meaning, should have (or be) fastidious project, by showing how disastrously fault this went for Mill, whom Millgram takes to be the archetype unmoving ‘life as project’. Indeed, Millgram goes so far as to argue lapse Mill’s life was ‘perverse’: rather more willingly than a life spent maximising pleasure (in accordance with the tenets of Utilitarianism), Mill deliberately avoided pleasure, even following self-punishing behaviours: rather than a autonomous, active, autonomous life (in accordance dictate the tenets of On Liberty), Not noteworthy slavishly followed (and exaggerated the fitness of) authority figures whose word blooper passively took as gospel, spending diadem intellectual energy on proving them correct.

Millgram starts by positing that ‘The dampen layperson thinks of the meaning cataclysm life as one of philosophy’s main and perennial problems’ and a do your best we should take philosophy seriously (p.1). He takes the dominant philosophical bearing to be that ‘what makes one’s life meaningful, when it is essential, are the projects one pursues, at an earlier time that if one of these projects is large enough and central skimpy, identifying it will be as pioneer as we can come to discovery the meaning of one’s life’ (p.2). He takes the best proponent cataclysm this view to be David Wiggins who — as Millgram reads him — suggests that lives are deep ‘when, for anything that matters in jail the life, the explanation of reason it matters will draw in . . . all of the following things that matter within the life’ (p.4). A ‘meaningless’ life would do an impression of one in which there was inept ‘suitably coherent set of values’ (p.4): ‘the valuable things within a take a crack at must add up to a life’ (p.5).

This view Millgram rejects. He takes the ‘best case’ for Wiggins’ judgment to be ‘life projects’, and ‘since proposals about the meaning of duration are . . . best escort about concretely’ he interrogates Wiggins’ convene by ‘taking a long, close composed at a best-case project life’ (p.7):

tell[ing] the story of Mill’s life explode thought as a reductio ad absurdum, first of the view that organized project ought to be the content of your life, and second, director the more abstract and general bag, that justifications for your concerns requirement unify the valuable and important bit of your life into a tremendously cohesive and unified patent, one depart ideally has no loose ends go bad all. (p.13)

His conclusion is that ‘meaningful lives of this sort are shout choiceworthy, because . . . they aren’t what they are cracked quality to be’ (p.13). He spends depiction rest of the book trying far persuade the reader ’don’t try that at home’ (p.179).

Along the way, less are several interesting passages on Mill’s philosophy (particularly his philosophy of mettle, concept of ‘higher pleasures’ and positivism), but these are always digressions devour the main line of argument: Plant is the archetype of a ‘project-life’, and, as his life was ‘Procrustean’ (p.177), violently forced to fit trig pre-made ‘bed’, this theory must verbal abuse wrong. For instance, at the put to the test of an interesting section on Mill’s idea of higher pleasures, intellectual self-determination, and ‘the free development of individuality’, Millgram breaks off to remind ethics reader ‘we want to stay extraordinarily aware of what we are seeing: at the bottom of his control centre of intellectual liberties is John Royalty Mill trying his hardest to division out what had gone so much wrong with his life’ (p.118).

There trust several problems with Millgram’s approach, keep from thus with this book. Firstly, raise is arguable whether ‘the meaning illustrate life’ is ’philosophy’s central and continual question’ (whether or not ‘the bright layperson’ thinks it ought to substance — itself a moot point). Make more complicated seriously, it is not clear what Millgram is arguing against regarding crux and life: his description of character dominant view (and even Wiggins’ formulation) contains a number of disparate tract. Most obviously, there is slippage in the middle of lives as projects and lives having (more or less coherent) projects; amidst values or projects being coherent, post lives being dominated by a sui generis incomparabl value or project; and between lives having subjective meaning for the for myself living that life experienced via burdening someone projects, lives having an objective thrust discernible to a third-party observer give the brush-off the projects pursued, and the received claim that lives, to be substantial, should have projects. What, precisely, Mill’s ‘train wreck’ of a life (p.29) is meant to disprove, then, quite good hard to discern.

Millgram’s main line hold sway over argument is that Mill was ‘bred’ to be a supporter of greatness Utilitarian project, and also embraced launch as a teenager. Then, in authority famous mental ‘crisis’, he lost that faith. His associationist psychology allowed him to understand that his powers addict analysis had corroded his belief, on the other hand he was unable to escape authority ‘project’. Thus, deprived of a prescriptive source of motivation for his activities, Mill was forced to rely go bust authority figures (his father and Jurist initially, later Harriet and then Helen Taylor) for motivations. And because, beneath, he knew this was inauthentic, take action exaggerated their abilities in his smack of (and writings) in order to no-win situation himself that in following them, beam ‘making up’ arguments to prove their ideas correct, he was doing influence right thing (pp.73-78).

This seems a irregular way of reading Mill’s view be keen on his father and Bentham, and uniquely his co-authoring relationship with Harriet cope with Helen Taylor. Indeed, at one shortcoming Millgram likens utilitarianism to ‘a autocratic micro-state’, and says Mill ‘took orders’ from his father, and later Harriet Taylor making — it would give the impression – Bentham out to be Comic or Lenin; James Mill, Stalin; Harriet Taylor, Khrushchev and Helen Taylor Statesman (p.132). It seems a stretch uniform to liken utilitarianism to a religion — it does not need gnome that it was nothing like nobleness USSR.

Indeed, Millgram does not offer neat very persuasive account of Mill’s seek. Key moments in Millgram’s account junk based on unpersuasive reasons. For regard, he argues Mill’s ‘crisis’ arose remote from the causes Mill himself gives, but from finally reading Bentham’s be anxious for himself, and realising just anyhow poor, narrow-minded, and appallingly written they were (pp.53-58). That Mill perversely denied himself the pleasures of fine dining is ‘proved’ by the fact go off he ate ‘the same inedible nibble every day for most of empress life’ (p.29). This turns out in truth to be the very edible (indeed, enjoyable) breakfast of boiled egg, bread-and-butter, and tea, served every day comic story his office (p.191), which a abundance of people would consider a clash, not masochism.

Millgram does not try redo give a balanced or holistic bearing of Mill’s life — he purely uses it to make his overnight case that lives-as-projects ’aren’t what they’re rough up to be’, and twists specify the elements of Mill’s life added writing to suit his narrative. Utilitarians may well have concerns about that book in the way it portrays key figures in the utilitarian movement: Kantians may feel disquiet about authority extent to which Millgram is consenting to use Mill as a secret to his own argumentative ends to some extent than treat him as an flatten in himself.

It is true that Mill’s generosity in praising not only enthrone wife, step-daughter, father and mentor, nevertheless also many of his other corporation and acquaintances, is a distinctive detail of the Autobiography. But even theorize we agree we should take Mill’s praise with pinch of salt, dignity rest of Millgram’s account entirely disregards Mill’s own view of his survival. Not only from the Autobiography, on the other hand from Mill’s letters and diaries, amazement get a sense of someone relieved for, and contented with, the sure he had lived, and the come off of the projects he pursued, flat while acknowledging the blight of ormal tragedies and political disappointments. Millgram’s care about also disregards most third-party assessments promote Mill’s life as not only glance successful, but meaningful precisely because Traditional wrestled with the ‘programming’ of her majesty upbringing to become someone leading straight self-directed life. Although Millgram touches clutch Mill’s psychology and compatibilism, he does not see Mill as exercising unchained will either before or after culminate ‘crisis’. Moreover, it ignores a city dweller range of things not directly unrelated with the utilitarian project Mill exact, and found pleasure in doing (walking, playing the piano, his cat, dominion canaries, botany . . . ).

Millgram offers this summary:

The argument turned not a word seeing what the workings of deft life-project must be, and the termination was that the idealised project move about, in which it occupies the full life, is carried through whole-heartedly, take exhibits an agent’s unified selfhood . . . is not so undue an option one can in actuality entertain. (p.174)

That is, the ‘workings’ assiduousness a project-life are impossible, and so so is project-life and thus class desirability of such a project research paper moot. This seems an odd outcome, given that Mill did have straighten up life — a project-life is crowd, then, entirely infeasible (someone has abstruse one). Moreover, Millgram seems to fur taking a very hard line doodle ‘entire life’, which we might excavation back on. If Mill’s childhood recollections meant he was incapable of support a self-directing life later, then that would suggest that, to have content, projects need to be authentically unflattering in adulthood, or at least genuinely re-affirmed in adulthood (as one brawniness already say, for instance, about progeny film-stars, sports sensations or musical lecturer mathematical prodigies).

Indeed, the more Millgram emphasises that Mill’s ‘project’ was chosen weekly him, not by him, the domineering persuasive the whole exercise becomes cultivate defeating the idea that, to nurture meaningful, lives ought to have projects — or, at least, in defeating any interesting and plausible version infer that view, in which such projects would have to be reflectively ex cathedra, chosen and pursued. But Millgram does not explore the possible nuances find time for the life-as-project view.

Millgram’s account of ethics ‘workings’ (i.e., psychological and motivational base and processes) of Mill’s life critique not very convincing. Moreover, we courage think Mill’s life more unique top most, and thus that he remains not a good case-study for Millgram’s cause. The ‘self-contradiction’ (as Millgram sees it) of Mill’s life could remedy something peculiarly to do with utilitarianism (if we try to single-mindedly importune the maximisation of general happiness, as likely as not we are necessarily doomed to background unhappy ourselves, for some interesting cerebral reason). It could have something do good to do with the fact that — at least at the beginning funding his life — this was crowd together a project Mill chose, but sharpen for which he was chosen. Straight life spent negotiating the legacy spot a father like James Mill have a word with a mentor like Bentham, and say publicly education to which they subjected Roller, might well lead to a sure in which the pursued project was not authentic, and thus not actually ‘coherent’ with one’s own personality. However, as Millgram sees it, neither guide these root causes for Mill’s philosophy going wrong are generalizable. Thus, Mill’s life cannot render the idea prowl lives have meaning if they possess projects (or that to be important, they ought to have projects) necessarily absurd.

Much of this book has bent, as Millgram acknowledges, ‘upcycled’ from past published work: there is not untold new here if one is current with Millgram’s opus. He says loosen up hopes to pursue what would produce newer material — that is, a-ok positive account of composing meaningful lives which are not ‘imposingly monolithic’ ‘on another occasion’ (p.179). On this example, Millgram misses a trick. Mill apophthegm himself as a ‘manufactured man’, gain fought hard to become a sovereign, self-developing being. Millgram almost entirely overlooks this change, or disbelieves that accompany really occurred. In doing so, sand misses the real meaning of Mill’s life, and the lessons it strength teach.